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a b s t r a c t
Decentralized disaster governance has been gaining much attention with the rising global urbanization
rate and the complex nature of the disasters occurring in densely urbanized areas today. This paper
studies the case of South Korea, a highly urbanized country with relatively recent decentralization re-
forms, in order to analyze the evolution of its disaster management system and to draw out implications
from its experience. Speciﬁcally, it traces the national-level institutional changes in its disaster man-
agement, and then closely examines a hydroﬂuoric gas leakage in the industrial city of Gumi. The ﬁnding
is that South Korea simultaneously carried out both centralization and decentralization of disaster
management, which are not contradictory but rather complementary. Nevertheless, while the country
successfully set up an integrated and comprehensive national-level management system, from which
disaster governance can successfully be decentralized to localities, it still requires much more developed
and consolidated multilevel (vertical) and broader (horizontal) collaboration, which are the pre-
conditions for decentralized disaster governance.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Given the contemporary mega-trend of rapid urbanization,
together with global climate change, both developed and devel-
oping countries are highly susceptible to various types of envi-
ronmental disasters with the potential to bring heavy destruction.
The increase in the frequency and severity of disasters is often a
direct result of the unsustainable nature of human developmental
activities, which are usually combined with a densely concentrated
population in urban areas (Smith, 2013; ADB, 2013). To identify
possible threats and risks of compound disasters, and to design
action strategies, many players and agencies across different levels
of government need to be involved (Comfort, 1999; La Porte, 1996).
With occasional exceptions, however, government ofﬁcials and
citizens usually have paid little attention to preventive measures or
mitigation strategies before a disaster actually strikes. Accordingly,
many individuals and localities have remained vulnerable to
disasters (Ainuddin, Aldrich, Routray, Ainuddin, & Achkazai, 2013;
Birkland, 2006; Thomalla, 2006).
Against this backdrop, international paradigms for disaster
management have begun to shift from post-disaster relief to pre-
disaster risk assessment and early warning systems, as indicated
in various international efforts such as the Hyogo Framework for
Action in 2005. At the same time, empowering local-level resilience
to cope with disasters has been emphasized, highlighting local
communities’ local knowledge and immediate access to impacted
sites (Paton & Johnston, 2001; Tobin, 1999). Now, many developed
and developing countries are carrying out disaster risk reduction
activities in the context of decentralized governance, and a number
of studies are underscoring the implications of decentralized
governance structure for effective disaster prevention and
mitigation.
In this regard, the East Asian region, which is undergoing rapid
urbanization and state restructuring processes, demands atten-
tion. While a large part of the population in the region still lives in
rural areas, hundreds of millions have moved to cities in the past
decade, and this trend of large-scale urbanization is expected to
continue in the coming decades (World Bank, 2015). The combi-
nation of concentrated urban populations and rapidly growing
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cities (often with unplanned development) implies increasing
possibilities for greater damage from environmental and man-
made disasters.1 At the same time, the countries in the region
have made signiﬁcant progress over the past several decades to-
ward decentralized governance, despite some variations (UCLG,
2008). Under these two circumstances, rapidly urbanizing East
Asia provides opportunities for empirical case analyses in disaster
management and decentralization that can produce useful
knowledge and implications for academic research and practical
policymaking.
South Korea (hereafter, “Korea”) constitutes an interesting
research case for exploring the development of disaster manage-
ment systems in the context of rapid urbanization, democratiza-
tion, and decentralization. According to World Bank data, Korea's
urbanization rate has been explosive in the past thirty years (from
54% in 1980 to 82% in 2014), accompanying its rapid economic
growth and industrialization.2 After decades of central government
dominance under the authoritarian regime, Korea democratized in
1987, and the ﬁrst local election was held in 1995. Since then,
civilian presidents have placed decentralization at the top of their
reform agendas, and a series of decentralization reforms has been
in progress (Bae & Kim, 2013). How has the changing context of
decentralization and democratization in Korea transformed the
landscape of the disaster management system, which had been
handled solely by the central authorities during the authoritarian
regime?
This paper traces the processes of institutional change in Korea's
disaster risk reduction policies since the 1990s, and also explores
the case of a hydroﬂuoric gas leak in amedium-sized industrial city,
in order to identify the organizational and contextual factors
necessary for effective disaster mitigation. On the one hand, since
the launch of the Basic Law for Disaster and Safety Management in
2004, Korea has made substantial progress in the institutional
framework development for assessing potential risk, improving
local resilience, and facilitating early mitigation under a decen-
tralized governance system. On the other hand, there has also been
lots of to-ing and fro-ing between the central and local govern-
ments behind the scenes of large-scale or controversial disasters,
often resulting in jurisdictional disputes and delayed post-disaster
management. Overall, the paper argues that Korea's disaster
governance has generally progressed with the national wave of
decentralization, but still requires much more developed and
consolidated multilevel (vertical) and broader (horizontal) collab-
oration. We look for evidence from government documents, media
coverage, and elite interviews.
2. Decentralization and disaster governance: a literature
overview
The extant literature has highlighted the importance of local
governments when it comes to delivering effective disaster man-
agement, as they have better understanding of unique local needs
and assets than the higher levels of government, and are the ﬁrst
ones to react to the disasters affecting their localities. In fact,
decentralization in general has been acknowledged to have a pos-
itive impact on public service delivery (Bardhan, 2002). Consid-
ering that disaster management is part of providing public safety
services, one can expect a positive relationship between effective
disaster management and decentralization.
Certainly, there are deﬁnite beneﬁts of decentralization, which
enables the local authority to apply local knowledge to disaster
management. First, different regions are prone to different types of
disasters. With better understanding of local contexts and vulner-
ability, the local governments can bemore effective in preparing for
the types of disasters that tend to occur in the area. Second, local
governments have comparative advantage regarding many critical
pre-disaster preparation-related issues, such as maintenance of
urban infrastructure, disaster-sensitive building and land use reg-
ulations, and emergency planning (Skidmore & Toya, 2013; Waugh,
1994). Third, disasters often take place unexpectedly and demand
immediate response. Local governments are in the position to
arrive ﬁrst on sitewith rescue and othermitigation efforts, and they
also possess the local knowledge of the particular place and cir-
cumstances, which can be greatly beneﬁcial in such emergencies
(Hayek, 1984). Finally, situations during complex disasters can
rapidly change, hence requiring strategies that can quickly adapt.
When decision-makers are at the local level, they are closer to the
disaster and are able to utilize local knowledge for more adaptive
and successful management (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007).
Yet there are also reasons to question the efﬁciency and effec-
tiveness of relying primarily on local governments for disaster
management. For instance, there is the structural issue of local
governments having to perform numerous tasks to meet the vari-
ety of local demands for public services, while their resources are
rather limited. Disastermanagement that targets high-risk but low-
probability events inevitably fails to become a top priority on the
generally under-resourced local government's agenda (Wolensky&
Wolensky, 1990).
The lack of local capacity becomes especially problematic for
newly decentralizing or developing countries. Many studies have
raised the concern that decentralized local governments of devel-
oping countries often lack ﬁnancial, human, and technical re-
sources required for disaster management activities (e.g., Butt,
Nasu, & and Nottage, 2014; Jha & Stanton-Geddes, 2013; Scott &
Tarazona, 2011; UNESCAP and UNISDR, 2012). While disaster risk
management has been argued to bemost effective at the local level,
in practice there seems to be a question as to whether the decen-
tralized local actors are indeed able to take effective actions in
disaster management (UNESCAP and UNISDR, 2012). The intention
here is not to argue against decentralized governance, but to raise
the issue that simply setting up a decentralized institution would
not be enough, and that strong intergovernmental and inter-
organizational collaborations are necessary for effective disaster
management.
The necessity for vertical collaboration, especially for mega-
disasters, is quite apparent. Even in the U.S. (with its federal sys-
tem having long supported strong local autonomy), local capacities
have been observed to be overwhelmed at the time of mega-
disasters, with local governments becoming paralyzed and unable
to provide meaningful assistance (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2005).
Analyzing the 2011 mega-tsunami catastrophe in Japan, Aoki
(2015) also underscored the role of national government and the
importance of vertical collaboration at such times of large-scale
emergencies. For the countries with low local capacities, technical
and ﬁnancial assistance from the national government at the time
of emergencies is even more necessary, making vertical collabo-
ration especially critical. On top of this, these countries, in their
push towards decentralized governance, often exhibit overlapping
regulations and unclear allocation of responsibilities between the
central, regional, and local levels of government (UNESCAP and
UNISDR, 2012). They thus require clearly determined delegation
and enforcement coming from the national government in disaster
management (Jha& Stanton-Geddes, 2013; Scott& Tarazona, 2011).
1 According to another World Bank report, 1.6 billion people in the region were
affected by various types of disasters, including tsunamis, earthquakes, and ﬂoods
(Jha & Stanton-Geddes, 2013).
2 Data retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS on
June 9, 2015.
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Therefore, the aforementioned non-Western case-based studies
argue (somewhat ironically) for enhanced leadership, oversight,
and coordinating roles of the national government, in order for the
decentralized disaster governance to work successfully.
Another important ingredient in ﬁlling the gap of low local
government capacities in disaster management is horizontal
collaboration with academics and various civil society organiza-
tions. These non-governmental local actors, with their specialized
knowledge and local networks, are valuable assets that the local
government could tap into during disaster response and recovery
efforts. In fact, building resilience at the local level with public
participation is increasingly being promoted and studied in disaster
management (for some examples, see Cho, 2014; Jones, Aryal, &
Collins, 2013; Jabareen, 2013; ADB, 2013; and Pearce, 2003).
What is evident in the literature on decentralized disaster
management is the need to build effective vertical and horizontal
collaborative networks. However, this is not easy to achieve.
Especially for Korea (as well as many other recently decentralized
countries), the short experience of local autonomy and participa-
tory governance poses signiﬁcant barriers. Yet, unlike many
developing countries, Korea has the advantage of a history of a
strong state and bureaucracy, which are also now leading decen-
tralization reforms. The remainder of this paper explores the ways
in which Korea has succeeded, and failed, in its striving towards
establishing a decentralized disaster management systemdﬁrst
through a discussion of shifting governance frameworks in the
country, and then through a case study of the response to a 2012
hydroﬂuoric gas leak in the city of Gumi.
3. Disaster governance reform in Korea: achievements and
challenges
Korea's economy developed tremendously over thirty years
under a highly centralized government that micromanaged local
governments and the civil society. The centralized governance
produced several side effects, including an uneven distribution of
wealth among localities, a lack of ﬁnancial resources for local
governments, and an absence of vibrant local civic community.
Against this backdrop, civilian presidentsdespecially Kim Dae-Jung
(1998e2003) and Roh Moo-Hyun (2003e2008)dcarried out
decentralization reforms. Among many agendas, the two admin-
istrations emphasized the following: substantial delegation of
central authority to subnational governments, guarantee of
autonomous decision-making authority over local affairs to local
governments, rationalization of local taxation systems, and
empowerment of local councils and citizen participation (Bae &
Kim, 2013: 265e6).
It was the Roh administration (2003e2008) that began to pay
attention to setting up a comprehensive decentralized disaster
management system. Previously, the national government had
mainly handled disaster-related issues, treating them from the
‘traditional’ national security perspective. This is understandable,
given South Korea's long-time tension with North Korea and the
military government that was in power until 1987 (PCGID, 2007:
14). Yet, for the civilian Roh administration, disaster was no longer
limited to the ‘traditional’ national security issues. Around the time
of his inauguration in 2003, Korea faced several mega-disasters,
including the deadly typhoon Rusa (2002),3 the underground
subway arson attack in Daegu city (2003),4 and outbreaks of avian
inﬂuenza (2003e2004) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) (2003). Under these circumstances, the Roh administration
sought to elevate disaster into a ‘comprehensive security’ concept,
and launched a ministry-wide task force, the “Planning Group for a
National Disaster Management System.” After a few months of
meetings, seminars, and discussion sessions, the task force came up
with a report highlighting the problems with the existing system
(MOGAHA, 2003).
First, it was hard to locate the disaster reduction or mitigation
responsibilities. The old disaster management system, based on the
Disaster Management Law enacted in 1995, caused inefﬁ-
cienciesdmainly because around 70 disaster-related laws and ex-
ecutive orders were under the jurisdiction of 13 different agencies
(Jeong, An, Im, & Moon, 2012). For example, storm- and ﬂood-
related issues were under the control of the Ministry of Govern-
ment Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA), and were
managed based on the Law of Natural Disaster. Anthropogenic di-
sasters were divided and separately controlled under the Ministry
of Construction and Transportation, the Ministry of Labor, the Na-
tional Police, and so forth. Similar types of disaster management
and mitigation efforts thus ended up being settled by different
agencies under different laws, ineffectively handling complex
disasters.
Secondly and relatedly, there was a highly inefﬁcient, dispersed
command-and-control system for disaster management and miti-
gation. On-the-scene command posts were dispersed among
different agencies, e.g. the ﬁre department, the military, emergency
medical services, civil defense, and the private sector. Subnational
governments were often confused as to with whom they should
communicate, about which responsibilities (PCGID, 2007).
Lastly, a comprehensive emergency plan and a manual to guide
the prevention andmitigation activities were lacking. Both national
and local governments were often preoccupied with other policy
agendas, especially those related to development and economic
growth; disaster management issues were usually given the least
priority. For example, during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, about
30% of disaster-related local bureaucrats in the 15 metropolitan
cities and provinces were cut, while the reduction rates in other
departments remained at about 10% (Ryu, 2007: 296). Furthermore,
elected local ofﬁcials have shown particularly low motivation to
prioritize disaster management policies that would add little to
their re-election campaigns (Lee & Ryu, 2010). The outcome was
often an under-staffed department with little motivation to actively
devise disaster management strategies.
To tackle these problems, the Roh administration launched the
‘Basic Law on Disaster and Safety Management’ (hereafter, “the
Basic Law”) in March 2004 (see Table 1), clearly streamlining the
operational procedures at the time of an emergency. Under this law
the disaster management system, which had previously been
dispersed among multiple agencies, was centralized and integrated
into a comprehensive management system, aiming to make a
timely and efﬁcient response possible. In particular, the National
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) was established in June
2004 as the control center for disaster management; the Central
Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters (for anthropo-
genic disasters) and the Committee for Anti-CalamityMeasures (for
natural disasters) were integrated into the National Safety Man-
agement Commission under the Prime Minister's Ofﬁce (Basic Law,
3 The typhoon Rusa, the most powerful one in 40 years at that time, resulted in
more than one hundred deaths and 25,000 homeless. Property losses reached more
than 300 million dollars. See BBC News, “Korean Typhoon Death Toll Rises,” on
September 2, 2002, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-paciﬁc/2230215.
stm.
4 The incident was reported as the second-largest subway arson attack in world
history. Hankyung, “The Number of Death Toll by Daegu Accident, Shamefully
ranked second in the world,” February 19, 2003, accessed at http://land.hankyung.
com/news/app/newsview.php?aid¼2003021926371.
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While the command structure was being centralized at the
national level, at the same time, decentralizationwas pushed under
the goal of achieving a ‘participatory’ management, centered on
citizens and local governments. Previously, what local governments
usually did at the time of emergency was to report local situations
to different agencies of the central ministries. This practice often
resulted in missed opportunities to reduce casualties. Inspired by
advanced countries' central-local network in disaster management,
the Roh administration put stronger emphasis on the roles of lo-
calities and mapped out clearer responsibilities. In 2005, the status
of a disaster management unit within the local government was
elevated from a subsection to a section level, and its personnel were
supplemented. Local governments were required to prepare a
standardized crisis response manual (PCGID, 2007), and local
public-private partnerships with mobilized volunteers and civic
expert groups were encouraged and supported.5 These efforts have
led to some notable achievements. For example, super-typhoons
and heavy rainfalls have been hitting the Korean peninsula every
year (see Table 2), but after the establishment of the NEMA and the
implementation of the national disaster plan with the emphasis on
the local governments' roles, the death toll and property damage
were greatly reduced, by around 60% and 40% respectively (NEMA,
2007). In fact, in the past few years, people killed by trafﬁc acci-
dents far outnumbered the death tolls from natural disasters
(NEMA, 2013).
Additionally, the Roh administration also developed a more
comprehensive database on disasters, and created a wireless ‘real-
time’ communication network among relevant government
agencies, which played a crucial role in improving the disaster
response capacity at initial stages (PCGID, 2007). The national
budget for disaster management also increased 5e10% annually,
and the heads of local government started to take more interest in
disaster management.
Subsequent administrations continued to be attentive to
disaster management development. For example, under the
catchphrase “OECD-level Safety,” the Lee Myeong-Bak adminis-
tration (2008e2013) attempted to strengthen the safety con-
sciousness among the general public, and to further enhance
local governments' autonomous decision-making in disaster
management (Jeong et al., 2012). In its 2nd National Basic Plan
for Safety Management (2010e2014), the administration
increased the budget for preventive countermeasures against
natural disasters, and also strategically integrated the hierarchi-
cal report line. It established the Ministry of Public Administra-
tion and Security (MOPAS) and designated it as the control
center (Table 1), under which NEMA then fell. As for the
incumbent, President Park Geun-Hye, her administration pledged
to introduce social network services and information technology
for disaster management, which was referred to as ‘smart
disaster management’ or ‘government 3.0.’ However, after the
tragic Sewol Ferry incident in March 2014, the Park administra-
tion was put under great pressure to revamp the entire disaster
management system. To showcase its effort, it dissolved both
MOPAS and NEMA, and created the Ministry of Public Safety and
Security (MOPS) as the control center (Table 1).
Although it is debatable whether the frequent closures and
creations of new control centers following each new adminis-
tration has brought any advancement, there undeniably have
been strong efforts toward developing a comprehensive disaster
management system and decentralized collaborative governance.
Yet the latter goal has proved to be particularly difﬁcult to ach-
ieve. For example, when the infectious foot-and-mouth disease
(FMD) was running rampant in 2010, it was pointed out that
local governments' misdiagnosis during the early stage of the
disease, and the avoidance behavior of both central and local
governments, caused the failure in controlling the FMD (Han &
Table 1
Key points of the new disaster management system.
Old system New system
Deﬁnition of Disasters  Natural vs. Manmade disasters  Integrated (Natural þ Anthropogenic þ
Security)
Relevant Statutory
Provisions
 Natural e Natural Disaster Law (1995)
 Manmade e Disaster Management Law (1996)
 Basic Law on Disaster and Safety
Management (2004)
 Specialized laws
Responsible Agencies  Storm and Flood (MOGAHA)
 Facility (roads, bridges, etc.) Related
(Min. of Construction and Transportation,
MOCT)
 Industrial Disaster (Min. of Labor)
 Transportation Disasters (MOCT)
 Fire/Explosion (MOGAHA)
Roh (2003e8) Control Center (NEMA) Lee (2008e13)
Control Center
(MOPAS)
Park (2013e) Control
Center (MOPS)
 Central Safety Management
Committee under the Prime Minister
 Creation of National Emergency
Management Agency (NEMA)
 Provincial Level Disaster and
Safety Countermeasure Headquarters
 City/County Level Centers
 Relevant central ministries
Note: MOPAS (Ministry of Public Administration and Safety, 2008e2013); MOPS (Ministry of Public Safety and Security).
Source: PCGID (2007), Jeong et al. (2012).
Table 2
Estimated property damage by natural disasters, 2002e2013.
Year Typhoon Rainfall Snow Storm Wind and wave Total
2002 5,185,728 929,564 0 0 0 6,117,294
2003 4,233,391 174,859 0 0 0 4,410,253
2004 341,561 214,977 673,897 0 0 1,232,439
2005 138,503 352,038 549,992 9304 0 1,051,842
2006 11,804 1,906,277 5175 14,039 5687 1,944,988
2007 160,869 43,492 7441 6879 33,128 253,816
2008 857 58,089 3,640,801 1115 0 3,702,870
2009 0 254,904 12,778 7035 24,089 300,815
2010 172,506 180,762 66,302 174 7036 428,790
2011 218,314 527,611 47,976 0 298 796,210
2012 1,003,715 38,430 20,351 932 0 1,065,440
2013 1689 158,128 11,342 932 44 174,148
Note: Unit ¼ million KRW (about 900 U S. dollars as of 2015).
Source: NEMA (2013), Disaster Yearbook, p.581.
5 MOGAHA internal document (2003), “A Comprehensive Plan for National
Disaster Management.”
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Jung, 2011). In the case of Seoul's ﬂash ﬂoods and landslides
caused by the record-breaking 536 mm rainfall over three days
in July 2011, the dissonance among different playersdincluding
the central and local governments, civil defense, and other
related agenciesdwas highly controversial (Jeong et al., 2012).
For example, the emergency management division (known as
‘119’), which is legally under the control of local governors, is
said to bypass them more often than not and report directly to
the central government.6 As for the private organizations and
citizens, except for a few highly visible mega-disaster cases (such
as the Heibei Spirit oil spill in 2007 and Seoul's 2011 ﬂoods and
landslides), where they made signiﬁcant contributions, their
participation in disaster management (if any) has usually been ad
hoc and unorganized (Won, 2013: 45).
In short, there seem to be ample cases that reveal weak
collaboration between the local government and the national
government, other governmental agencies, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and the general publicdand consequently, where the
local government fell short of capably demonstrating its authority
as the ﬁrst responsible institution at the time of disasters. The
following case analysis of a hydroﬂuoric gas leak in an industrial
city further highlights the necessity as well as the difﬁculty of
achieving participatory collaboration from diverse stakeholders in
a complex urban anthropogenic disaster.
4. Case analysis: leakage of hydrogen ﬂuoride (HF) in the
industrial City of Gumi
The City of Gumi, located in the southeastern part of the Korean
peninsula, developed as one of the national industrial complexes
starting in 1968. As a major host of Korea's leading exporters, the
semi-conductor industries, the city is now the largest industrial
complex in the country. Its exports reached US 30.5 billion dollars
in 2005, comprising 11% of the total exports from Korea.
On September 27, 2012, about eight tons of highly toxic gas
accidentally leaked at a chemical plant owned by Huber Global. It
was hydrogen ﬂuoride gas (HF), a chemical gas commonly used in
the manufacturing of semi-conductor chips. As Gumi has become
the main semi-conductor manufacturing site, the use and handling
of HF gas have also rapidly increased in the city. HF is highly cor-
rosive and poisonous, and exposure to it can cause serious injuries
to human lungs, bones, and nervous systems.
The leakage incident was caused by two workers’ failure to
safely unload HF from a delivery tank lorry to the Huber Global
chemical plant. According to the police report, the two workers
were trying to save time and did not follow the safety regulations
when connecting a high-pressure air hose to a valve in the tanker.
When the high-pressured vapor erupted from the tanker, the two
workers and three others nearby died on the spot (Gumi City, 2013).
In accordance with the disaster management manual, it was the
Gumi Fire Station that ﬁrst responded to the crisis by dispatching
ﬁreﬁghters to the plant. Yet they went without appropriate infor-
mation about the toxic gas leakage, and did not wear adequate
protection gear against the HF fumes. They even helped HF to
vaporize further by spraying it with water.7 The local ofﬁcials and
ﬁreﬁghters, who did not understand the seriousness of the HF leak,
failed to implement immediate countermeasures (Gumi City, 2013).
Eventually learning about the incident from the ﬁre station, the
city government issued an evacuation order to the residents and
factory workers nearby after four hours of being exposed to the gas.
Eight hours later, a CBR (chemical, biological, and radiological) team
from the National 119 Rescue Headquarters ﬁnally shut off the HF
leak and declared ‘all-clear.’ (Board of Audit and Inspection, 2013).
At the national government level, the Ministry of Environment
raised the safety alert level from ‘safe’ to ‘serious,’ and sent an initial
response team to spray the counteractive calcium hydroxide only a
day after. Due to the ‘belated’ response from both local and central
governments to such an urgent crisis, thousands of residents
complained of symptoms of nausea, chest pains, skin trouble, etc.
After thousands of people received medical treatment, the national
government ﬁnally designated the affected area as a ‘special
disaster zone,’ and promised to provide ﬁnancial aid, tax cuts, and
compensation to the residents.8 A total of 12,243 residents and
workers ended up receiving medical examination and treatment
for the symptoms caused by the leak; more than four thousand
livestock showed signs of disease; and about 212 ha of farmland
suffered from crop damage. According to the emergency unit's
report, 78 companies in the industrial complex suspended their
operations due to the exposure, and the reported damage totaled
about 17.7 billion KRW (Gumi City, 2013).
Although the city government and ﬁre station were in a better
position to gain prompt access to manage the incident, the city's
disaster division had only four to ﬁve generalists, which meant that
it was far from being ready to appropriately handle a crisis that
could easily involve any of the 40,000 dangerous chemical sub-
stances in use (Gumi City, 2013). In addition, the central govern-
ment (the Ministry of Environment, or MOE) and the Gumi
government squabbled over who was responsible for allowing the
residents to return only a day after the incident. On September 28,
the local government cited a low concentration of HF in the air and
advised the evacuated residents to return to their homes. Regarding
this overhasty call, the local government ofﬁcials explained that
they made it because the MOE had demoted the safety alert to the
‘safe’ level. Yet the MOE insisted that the decisional authority to
evacuatewas purely under the jurisdiction of the local government.
Moreover, while the MOE argued that they had advised the local
government to spray neutralizer (slaked lime) seven times, the
local government denied that account, saying they had never
received such advice.9
The national government dispatched an investigation team to
Gumi afterwards and concluded that the disaster governance
network among the related stakeholders had been seriously deﬁ-
cient. Many different agencies (e.g. the MOE, the Ministry of Labor,
the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, the Gumi city government,
NEMA, and other relevant public corporations) were involved in the
crisis to varying degrees, but the information sharing and cooper-
ation among them were not at all effective. Neither did the stan-
dardized manual on chemical incidents clearly pinpoint the
responsible agencies (Board of Audit and Inspection, 2013: 25e6).
The ﬁeld ofﬁcers from the NEMA also attested to the need for
further reorganization of the disaster management system to
clarify where the authorities and responsibilities actually lay
among different local and national agencies.10 Overall, the case
indicates how the push for decentralized disaster governance since
the early 2000s has not necessarily materialized and strengthened
the capacity of local governments in disaster management. The
6 Interview with a former MOGAHA bureaucrat, on February 15, 2015.
7 Nature, “Alert over South Korea Toxic Leaks,” on February 6, 2013, retrieved
from http://www.nature.com/news/alert-over-south-korea-toxic-leaks-1.12369.
8 Korea JoongAng Daily, “Residents near Gumi Hydroﬂuoric Leak Evacuate,” on
October 8, 2012, retrieved from http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/
option/article_print.aspx.
9 Yonhap News, “Environmental authorities bicker over whose responsibility the
hydrogen ﬂuoride was,” on October 10, 2012, retrieved from http://www.
yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2012/10/10/0200000000AKR20121010187000053.
HTML.
10 Interview with the former NEMA division head on August 20, 2013.
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Gumi city government still ended up being more or less dependent
on the central command, and could not effectively mobilize the
necessary collaboration, resulting in rather muddled disaster
governance.
While the government-centered network proved to be disap-
pointing, there were some emerging signs of possibilities for wider
collaboration involving non-state actors in the case. For example,
the Gumi city government and the medical doctors and public
health specialists in the private sector formed a joint public health
inspection team, screening more than 5000 people for free. The
hospitals in the city helped to mitigate the disaster's aftermath by
effectively handling the situation when more than 12,000 patients
with varying health symptoms ﬂocked to their emergency rooms.
Several local voluntary organizations, such as the New Town As-
sociation, also contributed to cleaning up the damage in their
neighborhoods. These assistance efforts from local hospitals and
voluntary organizations are noted to have enabled faster post-
disaster recovery in Gumi (Gumi City, 2013).
However, what was most critically lacking was very early
collaboration with the private sector and experts in identifying the
nature of the chemical crisis and in devising a proper ﬁrst-hand
response strategy. The urgency and highly technical nature of
such collaborationwould requiremuchmore proactive pre-disaster
preparation from the local government, as opposed to the post-
disaster recovery collaboration efforts that tend to be voluntary
and supplementary. Because a local government is able to make
better estimates of which types of disasters its city is prone to, it has
the capacity to obtain the speciﬁc local knowledge of where to ﬁnd
the needed experts in the specialized ﬁelds and build close con-
nections with them as potential collaborators. Stated differently,
local government needs to establish and maintain reliable re-
lationships and communication linkages with the necessary non-
state local actors prior to disasters, thus preparing itself for im-
mediate collaboration with the experts once a disaster strikes. This
preparation is highly important, because it helps enable both fast
and effective responses to the crisis at the local level, which is one
of the key potential beneﬁts of decentralized disaster governance.
In short, to produce better outcomes in disaster management,
competent horizontal (as well as vertical) collaborations are
required to underpin the local governments that cannot respond
effectively alone to the increasingly technical and often complex
nature of the contemporary disasters occurring in densely urban-
ized areas today.
5. Conclusion
This paper has examined the recent evolution of disaster
governance in Korea, a country with nascent democratization and
decentralization but a legacy of strong state institutions. The case of
Korea provides a noteworthy example of how a government
concurrently carried out centralization and decentralization of
disaster management. At the national level, it reformed the system,
which had been inefﬁciently dispersed and duplicated among
various national departments and agencies, into a comprehensive
and integrated one under centralized command and control. At the
same time, it made great efforts to decentralize disaster gover-
nance, highlighting the responsibilities and roles of the local gov-
ernment as the key unit in disaster management.
The simultaneous centralization and decentralization of the
disaster management system in Korea are not contradictory, but
complementary. Compound disasters often require multiple
agencies to become involved, and a clear and overarching disaster
management institution, under which local actors can proactively
plan and carry out their preparation and mitigation efforts, seems
highly desirable to ensure coordination. As a matter of fact, the
non-Western case-based literature on disaster management have
pointed out the necessity for strong and efﬁcient national govern-
ment and institutions, in order for decentralized disaster gover-
nance to work well (Jha & Stanton-Geddes, 2013; Scott & Tarazona,
2011). Before hastily embarking on the path of decentralization,
countries (especially developing ones) should check whether an
efﬁcient overarching disaster management system exists to begin
with. The Korean experience is exemplary for acknowledging this
missing component, and tackling both the challenges of decen-
tralization and of setting up an integrated disaster management
system, from which disaster governance can be successfully
decentralized to the local level.
However, Korea has much to improve when it comes to actual
disaster management at the local level. In the case of Gumi city, it
was apparent how both vertical and horizontal collaborations (the
preconditions for decentralized disaster governance) were very
much lacking. The HF leakagewas an accident that could have been
controlled as a minor incident if immediately handled properly, but
due to deﬁcient local government capacity it became a costly
citywide disaster. How the situation was handled afterwards,
involving multiple-level government agencies, paints an even
darker picture. Straightforward communication and cooperation
were absent, let alone vertical collaboration, with the local and
national governments playing the “blame game.” Horizontal
collaboration involving non-state actors was also missing in the
early stage of the disaster response, but proved to be better in the
aftermath recovery endeavors, suggesting a potential. Nevertheless,
in addition to the ad hoc and voluntary participation from the so-
ciety, more systematized collaboration from the private sector ex-
perts and academics is needed for the local government (which
often only has generalists in its disaster management division) to
adequately manage disasters.
But how can the vertical and horizontal collaboration be
enhanced in decentralized disaster management? First, there
should be increased awareness at the local level of the importance
of having a disaster management system. Local governments are
already preoccupied with numerous tasks that they are responsible
for, often working under very restricted ﬁnancial capacities. For
them to put extra effort into their local disaster management sys-
tem, there need to be electoral pressures as well as the watchdog
roles of citizens and mass media. Additionally, the growing
emphasis on disaster management overall at the national level, and
an increasing national budget that localities can tap into, can
contribute to raising localities’ interest.
As a matter of policy, the national government should also un-
derscore its ‘collaborative role’ in disaster management under
decentralized governance, rather than taking the approach of
merely passing down the responsibilities to localities. The Gumi
case illustrates how even a relatively well-to-do city, with a highly
proﬁtable industrial complex, was far from having a sufﬁcient ca-
pacity to deal with disasters. Given the steep regional economic
disparity among local governments within Korea (a phenomenon
also commonly observed in most developing countries in today's
globalization), the central government agencies would end up
taking bigger roles in disaster management than local governments
in a number of cases, notwithstanding the push towards decen-
tralized disaster governance. In these circumstances, the central
government should seek to devise a system that would allow fast
and effective collaboration with local governments at the time of a
crisis, and explore ways to bring out the strengths of local actors in
disaster management.
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